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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
These two cases present the issue of whether Utah Code Ann., 
Section 35-1-69(1)(b) (1953, as amended 1981) requires reimburse-
ment from the Second Injury Fund to an employer who has paid 
temporary total compensation and medical benefits if the worker's 
compensation applicant's permanent physical impairment attribut-
Case No. 20460 
Case No. 20474 
able to the industrial injury is 10% or greater and the percentage 
of permanent physical impairment resulting from all causes and 
conditions is greater than 20%. 
STfrTE^ EflT QF FACT? 
Sweeney 
1. The Utah State Insurance Fund was the compensation 
carrier for San Juan Pools on July 18, 1983, when a fiberglass 
slide fell, hitting Mr. Sweeney on the head (R. 78-80, 97). The 
injury resulted in the excision of a herniated cervical disc and a 
fusion of the vertebrae (R. 98-117). 
2. Mr. Sweeney had been involved in numerous industrial and 
non-industrial accidents prior to July 18, 1983, which resulted in 
permanent bodily impairment (R. 49-78). 
3. Mr. Sweeney was rated by the independent medical panel as 
having the following pre-existing permanent bodily impairment 
prior to the accident of July 18, 1983: 
a. 5% whole body impairment to the thoracic spine 
(R. 828, 846); 
b. 5% whole body impairment to the left hand and wrist 
(R. 828, 846) ; 
c. 20% whole body impairment to the left knee (R. 828, 
846) . 
Pursuant to the combined values chart, Mr. Sweeney's bodily 
impairment prior to July 18, 1983 was 28% (R. 859)'. 
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4. The independent medical panel assigned a 20% whole body 
impairment to the cervical spine injury resulting from the July 
18, 1983 accident (R. 829). 
5. 20% impairment of the 72% unimpaired man resulted in the 
Utah State Insurance Fund being liable for 14.4% whole body 
impairment (the Administrative Law Judge rounded this to 15%) 
(R. 849). 
6. The Utah State Industrial Commission required the State 
Insurance Fund to pay Mr. Sweeney 15% permanent impairment. It 
also required the State Insurance Fund to pay all of the temporary 
total compensation and medical benefits resulting from the 
July 18, 1983 accident without reimbursement from the Second 
Injury Fund (R. 850-851, 887). 
flaupin 
The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows: 
1. Mr. Maupin suffered injuries when he fell from a ladder 
on June 16, 1982, while in the process of installing an air 
conditioner on the roof of a house (R. 21-22, 821). 
2. As a result of Mr. Maupin's fall from the ladder, he was 
determined by the independent medical panel to have the following 
permanent physical impairments: 
a. 5% permanent partial impairment for residuals of 
sprain of the spine; 
b. 15% loss of bodily function for psychiatric diffi-
culties resulting from the injuries; 
c. 17% hearing loss in the right ear (R. 222, 223). 
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This totals 37% permanent bodily impairment caused by the 
industrial accident. However, when the Administrative Law Judge 
used the combined values chart, the resulting physical impairment 
was 33% (R. 304). 
3. In addition to the impairments that Mr* Maupin suffered 
in his June 16, 1982 industrial accident, he had also lost or 
permanently injured several fingers on his left hand in a non-
industrial accident that occurred in October of 1976 (R. 42-43) . 
The independent medical panel rated these left hand deficiencies 
as a 22% permanent partial impairment of the whole body, 
4. The Administrative Law Judge, in his Amended Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, found the employer and its 
insurance carrier liable for 25.74% permanent partial impairment. 
This was computed by determining the impact of a 33% impairment on 
a 78% person (R. 304). 
5. The Administrative Law Judge required the employer and 
its insurance carrier to pay Mr. Maupin the permanent partial 
disability of 25.74% of the whole person, and required the Second 
Injury Fund to pay Mr. Maupin 22% permanent physical disability of 
the whole person (R. 305). The Administrative Law Judge, however, 
denied the employer and its insurance carrier reimbursement from 
the Second Injury Fund for medical benefits and temporary total 
compensation which it had paid (R. 305-306). 
6. The Industrial Commission, in its denial of the employ-
er's Motion for Review, refused to allocate medical expenses and 
temporary total compensation paid by the employer (R. 310-312). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously and 
in excess of its authority by failing to allocate temporary total 
compensation and medical benefits between the employer and the 
Second Injury Fund, as required by Utah Code Ann., Section 
35-1-69, 
ARGUMENT 
UTAH CODE ANN., SECTION 35-1-69(1)(b) REQUIRES 
AN ALLOCATION OF TEMPORARY TOTAL COMPENSATION 
AND MEDICAL BENEFITS IN BOTH OF THE CONSOLI-
DATED CASES HEREIN. 
The clear language of Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-69(1)(b) 
(see Attachment A) mandates that when combined disabilities are 
determined, the industrial accident results in permanent physical 
impairment of 10% or greater, and the injured party has permanent 
physical impairment resulting from all causes and conditions 
greater than 20%, it is assumed that the industrial accident was 
made substantially greater by the pre-existing condition, and an 
allocation must be made to the Second Injury Fund. That Section 
requires the Second Injury Fund to reimburse the employer and 
its insurance carrier for temporary total compensation and 
medicals based on the percentage of permanent disability attribut-
able to preexisting conditions. 
Despite the numerous motions for review in both of these 
cases, the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission 
provided no reasoning for their failure to apply the statute as 
written. Such action by the Commission is arbitrary, capricious 
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and beyond the scope of their authority, and must be reversed by 
this Court. 
This Court has consistently required that the Industrial 
Commission allocate medical benefits and temporary total compensa-
tion between the Second Injury Fund and the employer based on the 
percentage permanent partial impairment from pre-existing condi-
tions bears to the applicant's total permanent physical impairment 
attributable to all causes and conditions. See McPhie v. United 
States Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 504 (Utah 1976); IntegfflQUntain ffefrlth 
Care, Inc. , v. Orteaa. 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977); American CPfll 
Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984). 
The Administrative Law Judge, in his Amended Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, relied on the case of Day's 
Marked lnq,f V, MyiJlr.r 669 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983), and cited the 
following language: 
The Fund's (Second Injury Fund) only applica-
t i o n i s where the c u r r e n t i n c a p a c i t y i s 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y grea te r than (the employee) 
would have incurred if he had not had the 
p r e - e x i s t i n g i n c a p a c i t y . This language 
r e q u i r e s a f ind ing as to the e f f ec t the 
p r e - ex i s t i ng incapaci ty had on the current 
incapacity. The finding in the abstract as to 
the to t a l pre-existing incapacity is of l i t t l e 
assistance in making th i s determination, since 
the full responsibi l i ty fa l l s upon the current 
employer unless i t could be said tha t the 
current incapaci ty i s subs tan t ia l ly greater 
than i t would have been "but for" the pre-
existing incapacity. 
This Court was i n t e r p r e t i n g the pre-1981 s t a t u t e in the Muir 
case . While the Administrative Law Judge accurately c i tes from 
that case, the language used stands for the proposition that the 
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Commission must make proper findings of fact in order to award 
Second Injury Fund benefits. In the 1981 amendment to Section 69, 
however, the Legislature added a paragraph in which the term 
"substantially greater" which is used in the first paragraph, is 
defined: 
For the purposes of this Section, (a) any 
aggravation of a pre-existing injury, disease, 
or congenital cause shall be deemed "substan-
tially greater", and compensation, medical 
care, and other related items shall be awarded 
on the basis of combined injuries as provided 
above; provided, however, that (b) where there 
is no such aggravation, no award for combined 
injuries shall be made unless the percentage 
of permanent physical impairment attributable 
to the industrial injury is 10% or greater and 
the percentage of permanent physical impair-
ment resulting from all causes and conditions, 
including the industrial injury, is greater 
than 20%, 
This additional legislative language establishes two separate 
circumstances under which the Commission must find that permanent 
incapacity is substantially greater than the applicant would have 
incurred if one of two conditions exist: (a) there is an aggrava-
tion of a pre-existing injury; or (b) if the industrial injury is 
10% or greater and the total physical impairment from all causes 
and conditions is greater than 20%, While the Administrative Law 
Judge was well instructed that he must make a finding of substan-
tially greater in order to trigger Second Injury Fund benefits as 
required by Dayfs Market. he is clearly required to make such a 
finding in both of the instant cases because in each case, 
although the applicant suffered an injury by industrial accident 
to areas of the body that were not previously incapacitated and 
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thus the industrial injury did not constitute an aggravation, each 
of the applicants suffered 10% or greater permanent incapacity as 
a result of the industrial accident and had permanent physical 
impairment in excess of 20% from all causes and conditions* 
Clearly, the statutory trigger for "substantially greater" is met 
in both of these cases. When such occurs, the provisions of the 
statute and provisions of this Court's prior cases requires that 
the Administrative Law Judge allocate temporary total compensation 
and medical benefits based on the combined disabilities* See 
American CPAI CO» Y. gan^stcQiBf supra. 
In denying the motions for review in both of the consolidated 
cases, the Industrial Commission failed to address the arguments 
raised by the State Insurance Fund requesting application of the 
provisions of the 1981 amendments to Section 69, and continued to 
characterize the cases as cases where no aggravation occurred to a 
pre-existing condition, a claim which the State Insurance Fund 
clearly never made. The rationale of the Commission's denials of 
motions for review is that there would not be an allocation of 
temporary total disability benefits and medical expenses where the 
industrial accident did not act upon, change or in any way 
increase the pre-existing condition. The Commission clearly 
ignores this Court's oft stated purpose underlying the Second 
Injury Fund; that is, to encourage employers to hire previously 
impaired individuals. 
While Mr. Maupin's fall from the ladder did not directly harm 
his previously impaired left hand, he clearly went from a 22% 
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impaired person to a 48% impaired person* Likewise, while 
Mr. Sweeney's rupture of the cervical disc did not act directly 
upon his previously impaired knee or thoracic spine, he went from 
a 28% impaired man to a 42% impaired man. While it is absurd 
for the Commission to ignore the direct statutory language, it 
seems even more farcical that the Commission cannot find that each 
of these men has permanent incapacity which is substantially 
greater than they would have incurred if it had not been for their 
pre-existing incapacity. When such test is met either by meeting 
the 10/20 Rule specified in the statute, or by the Industrial 
Commission making the finding that permanent incapacity was made 
substantially greater by a pre-existing incapacity, Utah Code 
Ann., Section 35-1-69 is clear that: 
Compensation, medical care and other related 
items as outlined in Section 35-1-81 shall be 
awarded on the basis of the combined injuries, 
but the liability of the employer for such 
compensation, medical care, and other related 
items shall be for the industrial injury only 
and the remainder shall be paid out of 
the Second Injury Fund provided for in Section 
35-1-68(1). 
CONCLUSION 
Both of the applicants suffered industrial injuries that 
resulted in permanent incapacities greater than 10%. Each 
applicant now has permanent incapacities in excess of 20% from all 
causes and conditions. The 1981 amendment to Utah Code Ann., 
Section 35-1-69, in paragraph (1)(b) requires the Commission to 
find that the applicant's incapacity was made substantially 
greater due to the pre-existing conditions and to allocate 
9 
temporary total compensation and medical benefits between the 
employer and the Second Injury Fund, 
DATED this :i_ day of April, 1985. 
BLACK & MOORE 
'',-/ 
uLZJ. 
Fred R. Silvester 
•f < -p A c , , -^ , zK 
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